Introduction
In November 2002, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the annual Global Competitive Report was presented -a ranking of the 'growth climate' of industrialized countries. Among the 10 countries considered the most conducive to economic growth were the Scandinavian countries: Finland came second (after the US), Sweden fifth, while Norway and Denmark were ninth and tenth on the list. Large EU countries such as France, Germany and the UK were all behind the Scandinavian countries.
This ranking may be surprising, since the Scandinavian countries have become recognized for their egalitarian ambitions, high levels of taxation, generous welfare provision, highly organized labour markets and coordinated market relations in general. This might not be seen as the typical societal model that thrives in a business climate marked by globalized markets and rapid technological change. Such an economic model would, instead, seem to function better with market-conforming institutions, with low levels of taxation, deregulated labour markets, limited social protection, and so on (Strange, 1996) . However, nations respond to similar external challenges in different ways (Pfaller et al., 1991; Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997; Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001 ). Thus, there seems to be no convergence among national policies for growth, employment and social protection. These policies have often evolved over a long period, and are based on specific class relations, forms of state organization, business systems, and so on (Soskice, 1999; Whitley, 2000) .
The post-war period witnessed the emergence of a particular kind of social and economic model in the small and peripheral Scandinavian countries. They were late developers, initially industrialized on the basis of rich supplies of raw materials. They were open economies, gradually moving from raw materials exports to more advanced production for international markets. They were also marked by the formation of relatively peaceful political coalitions in the 1930s, as well as the centralization of industrial relations. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries were early developers of more advanced, universal and ambitious welfare programmes under the aegis of social democratic parties (Mjøset et al., 1986; Esping-Andersen, 1990) .
In recent history, this socio-economic model has been confronted with a series of challenges: the crisis of the mass production industrial paradigm and stagflation in the 1970s, the restrictions on state expenditure following the internationalization of financial markets and markets for goods and services in the 1980s and 1990s, and the emergence of a knowledgebased economy in the same period (Mjøset, 2002) . This article concentrates on institutional adjustments in relation to the latter two. The emphasis is on the development of two sets of policies and regulatory spheres:
• public expenditure on social services and insurances, and the regulation of labour market relations, in particular wage bargaining. This regulatory sphere is related to the restrictions imposed by globalized financial and product markets on state expenditure, taxation, labour costs and wage increases.
• public policies for research and innovation.
This enabling regulatory sphere is related to the pressures for upgrading the scientific, technological and industrial infrastructure as a response to the rise of new technological paradigms and the increasing role of knowledge-intensive production for growth, employment and exports (Larédo and Mustar, 2001 ).
The adjustment of policies is explored here in some detail, with reference to the way in which external shocks are interpreted and how this interpretation is related to changes of institutional arrangements and policy frameworks (Schmidt, 2000) . Adjustment, in this sense, refers to the development of social foundations for policy changes, the sequencing of policy responses during crisis management, the development of new institutions or the redeployment of older ones, and the legitimization of policy change. Thus, the politics of adjustment refers to how effective governments and social organizations are in their 'institutional learning capabilities' (Hemerijck and Schludi, 2000) .
The central issue is why the Scandinavian countries are performing so well in the 'new economy', as a shorthand term for an economic system marked by internationalization of markets for goods, services and capital, and the rapid introduction and dissemination of new technologies within flexible production systems. More specifically, the following issues are addressed: In what way have the Scandinavian countries adapted their growth strategies to the demands of an increasingly globalized and knowledge-intensive economy? What institutional arrangements for a structural transformation have they developed? And have they, in that process, changed their commitment to redistribution, equality and full employment? Have they become 'competition states' (Cerny, 1997) , or 'Schumpeterian workfare regimes' (Jessop, 2002) , putting the demands of the knowledge-intensive and internationalized economy above their old commitments to welfare and redistribution?
Two challenges to the Scandinavian model: globalization and the emergence of a knowledge-based economy
The nebulous term 'economic globalization' has many dimensions (Garrett, 2000) . One is the globalization of financial markets. A second is the international integration of markets for goods and services. A third is the internationalization of companies, including the development of global networks for innovation and production, and the growth of foreign direct investments.
Recently, political economists have focused much of their attention on the adaptation of welfare states to changing economic conditions, such as stagnant productivity growth, the internationalization of financial markets, and the ageing of the population, factors putting enormous pressure on government expenditure (Pierson, 1994; Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Scharpf, 2000) .
Labour market regulation is also affected by the internationalization of the economy and the emergence of norms-based international monetary policies (such as the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU). However, the adaptation process has not taken place in a uniform way. Some countries have developed decentralized, flexibility-supporting policies, while in others there has been a recentralization of industrial relations and wage bargaining, which have been devised and organized through various 'social pacts' (Regini, 2000; Soskice and Iversen, 1999; Rhodes, 2001) .
The first challenge for the Scandinavian countries is therefore targeted at their social model: the perceived need to develop mechanisms for wage restraint and continuous improvements in production organization to strengthen the international competitiveness of their export-oriented companies and establish a curb on state expenditure to avoid punishments from international finance. This dimension of the adaptation process therefore stresses the restrictions imposed by internationalized markets for finance and products on the Scandinavian welfare and employment systems (characterized by highly organized labour markets and taxfinanced social services and cash-benefit programmes; see Table 1 ).
The underlying conditions for economic growth, employment and, indirectly, social expenditure are also experiencing profound change. This transformation has been described as a transition towards a knowledge economy, a model of economic accumulation based on flexible production technology, a disintegration of corporate hierarchies into networks, and an increasing importance of economic networksinstead of firms -as loci of economic activities (Magnusson, 2000; Cooke, 2002a) . The foundation of economic growth lies in the cultivation of knowledge-based production, and this, in turn, forces economic actors to interact in supportive and productive environments that cannot be organized by firms individually (Castells, 1996; Powell, 2001) .
Studies of the evolution of innovation and economic growth have emphasized the importance of learning, interconnectivity and flows between actors for economic growth and employment (Edquist, 1997; . The economic growth, employment and income equality of a nation or region are therefore critically dependent on the ability of the nation to upgrade technologically (Fagerberg et al., 1999) .
Although the empirical focus of studies of science, technology and innovation was initially on national innovation systems, due to the longlasting importance of national institutions (cf. Nelson, 1993) , the focus is now often on aspects of techno-industrial change that do not follow national boundaries. This includes the emergence of supranational innovation systems driven, in particular, by firms with operations spanning several countries, or in the form of cooperation between firms in different countries (Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Hagedoorn, 2002) . Furthermore, multinational firms are breaking up their organization into smaller units linked to international networks of production, research and development. Functions such as production, marketing and distribution, traditionally integrated within the firm, are outsourced to specialized firms (Powell, 2001) .
A somewhat paradoxical development is that the significance of the regional dimension of innovation seems to be increasing (Cooke, 2002b) . Such regional clusters are marked by the interplay between smaller firms, or between large firms and smaller, specialized companies, the interaction between universities, consultancy firms, financial actors, public agencies and industry in the development and dissemination of new knowledge. Regions, therefore, tend to become 'quasi-firms', made up of all the competencies of the classical firm, but organized as formally separate entities, with flexible linkages between the actors inside and outside the region (Asheim and Isaksen, 2002; Cooke, 2002c) .
The rise of a knowledge-based economy highlights the growing importance of universities and other research institutions within the economic system. The role of scientific knowledge is becoming increasingly important to innovation, and there is a growing political focus on collaboration between industry and academia (Stokes, 1997; Branscomb, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Godin and Gingras, 2000) .
The rise of a knowledge-based economy shows also in the growing significance of (Morange, 1998; Drews, 1999; Davies, 2001) . The second challenge to advanced welfare states is therefore to enable the development and dissemination of innovations and new technologies. It can be hypothesized that governments will support industrial innovation more broadly by backing up new knowledge-based sectors or technologically upgrading existing ones. This would include policies targeted at developing and/or reinforcing local or regional clusters of innovative actors and organizations, and creating private-public partnerships for innovation, in particular partnerships that involve universities (Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999) .
I now move on to a survey of the responses of the Scandinavian countries, and in the concluding section some comparative lessons are drawn from the differences within the Scandinavian policy paradigm.
A Finnish miracle?
The 1990s were a turbulent period in the Finnish economy and in Finnish society. The economy went from a period of boom in the 1980s to deep crisis caused by a most unfortunate combination of a banking crisis, a collapse of trade with the former Soviet Union and the failed attempt to peg the Finnish mark to the ecu (Honkapohja, 1993) . Remarkably, Finland soon went back to a boom marked by very high growth rates, up to 6% in the latter part of the 1990s. Arguably, this was the result of a successful transformation of the Finnish economy from a basis in raw-materials extraction and processing into a knowledge-based, innovative society (Ormala, 2001) . Many indicators point in this direction (see Table 2 ). Total investments in research and development increased from 1.8 per cent to over 3 per cent of GDP between 1990 and 2000, and Finland's share of the world's scientific output went up by almost 40 per cent between 1990 and 2000 as measured by scientific publications per million inhabitants (see Tables 3 and 4 ). Finland also has the second largest share of Internet hosts per inhabitant, after the US. The industrial structure -with exports historically dominated by paper and forestry products -has been turned around: today, exports from the electronics sector are larger than those of the paper and pulp industry (Ormala, 2001) . In a remarkably short period of time, Finland has been transformed from a peripheral country with a relatively underdeveloped economy into what seems like a model for the development of an innovative, knowledge-based economy and society.
The transformation of the Finnish economy has been accompanied by a marked reorientation and strengthening of growth Finland, 1993: 40) . Hence, it was stated early during the recession that an activist, structural economic policy should form the backbone of the crisis management, and that adequate support for the renewal of the innovation system must be secured.
A massive increase in government spending on R&D was decided in 1995, when 3200 million Finnish marks were to be spent with the aim of increasing the share of R&D expenditure from 2.5 per cent to 2.9 per cent of GDP between 1996 and 1999. The ambition was to stimulate Finnish research in general, but also to strengthen the innovation system in certain regions and industrial sectors. To avoid pressures on the state budget, the whole research and innovation package was funded by the sale of public companies. The extra funding for research and innovation has been distributed over three broad areas: academic research, with a programme for Centres of Excellence (CoEs) and larger appropriations to universities; support to industrial clusters; and, finally, a stimulus of regional innovation systems.
The Finnish position in the global research landscape has historically been relatively weak. To improve the productivity and quality of Finnish research, programmes for national CoEs were established in 1993 (Academy of Finland, 1997) . In the first round, 17 of these centres were established by the Academy of Finland (which is the funding organization, along with universities, industry, public agencies and the EU). In 2000, a new round of centre support began, and 26 centres were established. The centres are generally quite large, involving up to 150 researchers, mainly specialized in biomedicine and engineering, although a few have also been started in the natural sciences, social sciences and the humanities. The CoEs pursue both basic and applied research and work in an interdisciplinary fashion. They are intended to play a key role in the development of Finnish society, pursuing research that can 'contribute to creating the information base required for cultural, social and industrial development, and consequently to forming a solid base for a national innovation system . . .' (Academy of Finland, 1997: 22) . The intention is, partly, to support the training of new researchers and to develop a new elite research cadre and, partly, to support and strengthen research areas of importance to industry and society.
As a complement to the support for developing a stronger and more coherent science base, industrial research and development was also enhanced. This industrial renewal programme, with a total budget of over two billion Finnish marks, has an orientation towards industrial 'clusters', targeting sectors such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, information technology, food, forestry, communications, transport and environment. Funding is provided for research collaboration between firms, and between firms and academic organizations within these clusters, to further the introduction of new products and production processes and to explore new areas of science and technology with potential industrial applications.
Furthermore, Finland has pursued an active policy towards the development of regional innovation systems -both in the centre and the periphery of the country. The regional innovation programme, labelled Centres of Expertise, supports multi-organizational local constellations, incorporating universities, hospitals, firms and science parks, for instance in the biotechnology area. Several of the Centres are located in peripheral parts in the North, for instance in the Oulu and Kuopio regions (Cooke, 2002c) . Other regional constellations, specialized in information technology and telecommunications, have also been reinforced through the Centres of Expertise. The programme, where the state and public organizations play a central role, has established a corporatist model of industrial renewal, based on local 'innovation pacts'. This is very different from the free market-based model associated with areas like Silicon Valley, where innovation is driven by a combination of venture capitalists and academic entrepreneurs. This indicates that also coordinated economic systems can be highly innovative (Castells and Himanen, 2002) .
The welfare and employment systems were deeply affected by the collapse of the Finnish economy in the early 1990s. Finland was a welfare state laggard until the late 1980s, when it had adopted similar social policy principles as in the other Scandinavian countries (Marklund, 1988) . When the economic boom of the 1980s -with growth rates of over 3 per cent annually -was reversed, and growth rates became negative, unemployment exploded and reached over 18 per cent in 1993 (OECD, 2002b; see Table 5 ). The five-party government responded to the crisis by reducing replacement levels in the unemployment insurance, sick pay and parental insurance, increasing the share of individual contributions, and introducing more waiting days. An important part of the ongoing reform process are plans for a new pensions system modelled after the Swedish pension system with benefits based on lifetime earnings. Despite these cost-reducing measures, the welfare system remains broad in its coverage and with relatively generous replacement levels. The reforms have therefore been more of a quantitative than a qualitative nature (Huber and Stephens, 2001) .
Stabilizing measures have also been introduced for public expenditure and wage bargaining. A stability pact, with pledges to have large budget surpluses as part of a buffer to global economic downturns, has been devised to counteract cyclical and structural downturns of the economy in the future. Labour market regulation was also affected by the sharp dip in employment: since the crisis, wage bargaining has been organized as centralized, incomes policy-styled, social pacts, involving unions, employers and the government. The pacts have successfully produced wage restraint and established the export sector as a wage leader, although tensions among the parties have grown with the decrease in unemployment (Telasuo, 2000; OECD, 2002b) .
If the policy responses to the emergence of a knowledge-based global economy are organized into two categories, restrictions and enabling policies, we find that Finland has combined these two into a two-pronged growth strategy. The political system has adapted to the openness and deregulation of markets for finance and goods by developing ceilings for public expenditure, by limited reductions of social expenditure and by social pacts to contain wage increases. Thus, social policy and industrial relations have been tightened to cope with the fluctuations of an open world economy. This does not represent a radical break with the institutional structure of the welfare state or of the labour market. The welfare systems have become less generous but not radically retrenched, while wage bargaining has, in fact, been re-centralized. Finland has, at the same time, used public-private partnerships and massive investments in innovation support to bring about a resolute upgrading of the domestic science base and the technological capabilities of industrial clusters -in both hightechnology and more mature sectors -and regions, those in the centre and also those in the periphery.
The policy adjustment process has been marked by a relative lack of social and political disintegration and conflict. The depth of the crisis in the early 1990s led to a conviction that the traditional growth pattern of the economy was no longer viable. A new strategy was then implemented on the basis of three pillars: a political consensus to upgrade the scientific, technological and innovative capabilities, a commitment from the labour market parties to bring about wage restraint through wagebargaining centralization and the maintenance of relatively generous social insurances to absorb the consequences of the economic crisis.
However, the Finnish strategy is not without difficulties. Much of the growth strategy is centred around the information and communication technology sector, and, to be more specific, around one company, Nokia. The current crisis of the high-tech sectors has therefore hit the Finnish economy more than the other Nordic countries (OECD, 2002b) . It might, therefore, be too early to judge the Finnish miracle as a stable model of growth given its extreme dependence on one sector. However, there are signs of a broader revitalization of the economy. For instance, the large investments in technological development for the biotechnology and food industries are resulting in several important product innovations (Cooke, 2002c) . In all, Finland must be said to be one of the clearest examples of a rapid and concerted policy response to the imbalances of the 'new economy'.
Norway: a future after oil and gas?
The Norwegian socio-economic model is based on exceedingly rich supplies of oil and gas. According to recent estimates, oil and mineral extraction represents almost half of Norwegian exports (OECD, 2002c) . As a result of the large state interest in the oil industry, oil incomes represent no less than one-fifth of the total state revenues in the year 2001. Apart from oil, Norwegian industry has traditional strongholds in shipbuilding, transport and shipping, but Norway is not a major industrial power. Rather, Norway stands out as an innovation laggard, with small high-technology sectors, limited investments in research and development by international comparisons, and with rather limited investments in corporate R&D (Kuhlmann and Arnold, 2001 ; see Table 3 ). Furthermore, Norwegian companies are domestically oriented and perform most of their R&D in Norway rather than -as Swedish or Finnish firms do -within international knowledge networks. To compensate for the limited investments in corporate research and development, a very large public research institute sector has emerged, with more than 100 institutes accounting for about a fourth of all R&D expenditure (Norges forskningsråd, 2002). The Norwegian innovation system therefore deviates from the other Scandinavian countries through its large dependency on public efforts; it is, as has been the case throughout the post-war period, a state-centred development model, with the private sector playing only a complementary and secondary role to the state in the modernization process (Slagstad, 1998) .
Economic development in Norway has been more stable than in the other Scandinavian countries in recent decades. There was a creditbased expansion of the Norwegian economy in the 1980s, similar to the one in Finland and Sweden, but without the severe consequences experienced by the other Scandinavian countries when the boom ended in the early 1990s. After the decentralization of industrial relations in 1998, negotiations are now conducted at the industry level. There is general agreement to keep wage increases at the same level as Norway's trading partners. The welfare model has remained relatively unchanged during the 1980s and 1990s, and if anything has become more generous, for instance in parental insurance (Huber and Stephens, 2001 ). Unemployment never reached higher levels than 5 per cent and has continued at about that level throughout the 1990s. On the basis of the oil reserves, Norwegian state finances remain sound with a hefty budget surplus (currently 14 per cent of GDP) that is now invested in a Petroleum Fund as a reserve for a future without oil and gas (OECD, 2002c) .
The Norwegian modernization strategies have followed roughly the same pattern as in the other Scandinavian countries. After the Second World War, a general modernization of the research system was prioritized, based on the assumption that basic research would eventually result in technological innovations, new products and a higher economic growth. Later, the emphasis shifted to sectoral support of heavy industrialization and support to military technology, electronics and telecommunications. In the 1970s, the oil industry was integrated into the arsenal of industrial policy instruments, where the public oil company Statoil was given broad regional and employment policy obligations (Slagstad, 1998: 436 ff.) .
A less state-centred development approach was begun in the 1980s, with the conservative Willoch government abandoning the system of 'credit socialism' and deregulating the credit market (Mjøset et al., 1994) . However, this had little effect on the industrial structure, where the dominance of the oil instead grew. In the 1990s, the political emphasis has clearly shifted towards developing broader technological and scientific capabilities, that is, to reinforce the Norwegian innovation system in order to broaden Norwegian industry. A major attempt to develop stronger industrial and technological capabilities was the reform of the research funding system in 1993. At that time, the Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF), the main vehicle for technology policy, was merged with the other research councils into the Research Council of Norway (RCN). Two divisions within the RCN, one for Industry and Energy, the other for Science and Technology, have acted jointly to integrate the support of basic research, applied research and industrial development within one organizational umbrella. These policies have been labelled an 'innovation policy' by the RCN, which has been further emphasized in a new strategy for industrial research and development support. Here, the main target has been identified to strengthen the capabilities of industry by supporting user-driven projects and so-called enabling projects (Kuhlmann and Arnold, 2001: 21-2) .
The regional dimension has been central in Norwegian growth and industry strategies throughout the post-war period and continues to be so today. The emphasis of regional support has shifted from attempts to relocate industries to peripheral regions to developing a nationwide institutional infrastructure for growth and innovation. The main vehicle for regional innovation support is SIVA (Industrial Development Corporation of Norway), which owns a large number of science parks, supports regional venture capital funds and runs a number of 'development companies'. Recent evaluations indicate that SIVA is an efficient institutional supporter of small start-up firms, but also that it has not been able so far to develop strong innovative networks. Hence, high-tech success stories (such as the concentration of information and telecommunication industries to Fornebu in Oslo) are isolated phenomena with limited integrated and systemic effects on the regional environment. This confirms the difficulties in bringing about structural changes of the Norwegian economy, despite public interventions (STEP Group, 2000) .
The international status of Norwegian research continues to be of some concern to the political system. R&D expenditure in Norway is still well below the OECD average, and Norwegian research is lagging behind the performance of the other Scandinavian countries (see Tables 2  and 4 ). In an attempt to restructure Norwegian research, a programme for strategic research centres and concentrated research environments has been launched. Thirteen of these centres were selected in late 2002, receiving annual support of up to 20 million Norwegian kroner from the Research and Innovation Fund. The Fund is in itself a response to the weakness of Norwegian research. It was established in 1999, has a capital stock of 7.5 billion kroner, and will distribute more than 400 million Norwegian kroner to research in 2003.
Despite the efforts to consolidate Norwegian research and focus on areas of great scientific potential, it is argued that the extra funding will not strengthen Norway's international position. Just one centre in biomedicine will be funded (in molecular biology and neuroscience), and one with focus on telecommunications, while the rest of the centres cover research in areas such as petroleum, climate, aquaculture, shipping and peace and conflict resolution -all traditional strongholds in Norwegian research, but not the most fashionable or dynamic research fields. Some critics have implied that regional and industrial policy concerns had an influence on the process (Norum, 2002) . It seems clear that the centre programme in itself will not bring about a radical increase in the 'critical' areas of biotechnology, information technology and advanced materials. Norwegian science policy, instead, continues to build on existing strongholds rather than cultivating new ones. However, it should be mentioned that the Research and Innovation Fund, responding to policy initiatives taken in other countries, established a programme for functional genomics research, and that the RCN has major support programmes for the information and communication technologies, targeting the large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, the current centre-right government recently presented an agenda for upgrading the research and technological infrastructure of Norway. The main goal was set as a radical increase in R&D expenditure, reaching the OECD average of 2.5 per cent of GDP by the year 2005, and a doubling of the capital of the Research and Innovation Fund. Furthermore, it has been announced that the RCN will be reorganized to improve the interaction between basic and applied research (STEP Group, 2002) . However, it seems unlikely that the target will be reached, considering that corporate expenditure on research and development is expected to represent the largest share of this increase. The Norwegian economy is still based on relatively low-technology sectors, where radical innovations or major technological discontinuities are rare, and R&D expenditure accordingly is relatively low (see Table 3 ).
Norway is a rich country with an extreme dominance in one sector, the oil industry, which has consolidated a growth pattern based on exports of raw materials and imports of refined goods (Mjøset et al., 1994) . On the basis of the oil incomes, the Norwegian state now runs a large budget surplus, while inflationary pressure remains low owing to the stability of the industrial relations system. Recent labour shortages, however, are triggering large wage hikes (OECD, 2002c) . On the whole, the Norwegian economic institutions have handled the restrictions of the open economy well. However, the promising figures should not obscure the need to develop sectors and industries outside raw materials extraction, if the current levels of welfare and growth are to be maintained after the oil reserves are finished. The welfare and employment systems have been relatively successfully adapted to the open, international economy, and have done so without much turbulence on the labour market or in the political system, but the research and innovation system remains relatively underdeveloped by international comparisons. Arguably, this is the result of the extreme dominance of the oil industry but also the dirigiste role of the state in industrial development (Parker, 2000) . Furthermore, there seem to be no political entrepreneurial initiatives for a new growth model in response to the challenges of the knowledge-based economy. For instance, the most recent electoral campaign was focused on issues of redistribution rather than on production and innovation (STEP Group, 2002) .
Norway seems stuck in its traditional growth paradigm, which at the moment is more than sufficient to support a full employment labour market and a universal social policy regime. The question that remains to be answered is how a new growth model can be supported, and how the government can promote the rise of knowledge-based industrial sectors. While the reforms of research and innovation support signal a more coherent and dedicated stance toward research and technological innovations, they have not been integrated into a broader policy package of industrial modernization. Whether isolated policy initiatives are sufficient to break the dominance of the oil sector and establish new growth engines is, therefore, an open question.
Sweden: already a knowledge economy?
Unlike the other Scandinavian countries, Sweden has been able to build on a strong knowledge foundation in both the public and private spheres of society in its route to the knowledgebased economy. Indeed, it can be argued that Sweden -with its many knowledge-intensive multinational firms and highly productive research system -has been an ideal-typical knowledge society throughout the post-war period. Sweden has a large presence in several high-technology sectors, for instance telecommunications (Ericsson) and pharmaceuticals (AstraZeneca and Pharmacia). Furthermore, several high-technology sectors have flourished in Sweden during the 1990s, such as biotechnology and information technology, although companies in these sectors generally are smaller than the multinationals in telecommunications and pharmaceuticals. Sweden has been able to retain its scientific strength and has the largest international impact of all the Scandinavian research systems. Swedish research is particularly strong in areas such as immunology, clinical medicine, neuroscience, ecology and biochemistry (Persson, 2002) .
The Swedish economy has traditionally been based on the middle-high technology sectors (see Table 3 ). Generally, firms in such sectors, including engineering, machinery and paper and pulp, have followed an expected pattern of adaptation to a knowledge-based economy: they make major investments in research and development, as well as implement 'gradual improvements' in the production process (Brulin and Nilsson, 1999) .
A turning-point in modern Swedish history is the economic crisis of the early 1990s. After a decade of relatively stable growth rates, low unemployment, with higher than average inflation as the only major imbalance, the Swedish economy collapsed around 1990-1, when the Swedish Krona was pegged to the ecu to reduce inflationary tendencies, while a new tax system increased the incentives for savings. This, along with other imbalances in the economy, caused a very quick and unexpected hike in the unemployment rate, peaking at almost 10 per cent (see Table 5 ). At the same time, the budget deficit exploded to cover the costs of growing unemployment, while the decrease in demand within the economy led to shrinking GDP between 1991 and 1993. A number of policies have since been implemented to reduce unemployment and control public expenditure. Both centre-right and Social Democratic governments have reacted to rising unemployment by expanding training programmes during the 1990s -in effect a labour hoarding strategy. The main part of attempts to control public expenditure has been a reduction in the generosity of the social insurance system, including the use of fees and individual contributions, the introduction of waiting days and a general lowering of replacement rates in the social insurances. The pensions system has also been reformed to control costs and increase the supply of labour (by basing pensions on life-long employment). A large part in the cost-cutting process has also been borne by savings in health and social service expenditure (Huber and Stephens, 2001) . Despite these reductions in the commitments of the welfare state, Sweden has retained the fundamentals of its model of tax-financed social insurances and services, at least in an international perspective (Table 1) .
There have been a number of efforts to bring about wage moderation by the state but also by the labour market parties. A relative consensus has emerged on wage formation, where a 'European norm' has guided wage bargaining since the mid-1990s, with the export-oriented sectors as wage leaders. After a difficult beginning, the autonomous Central Bank and the labour market parties now communicate well on wage bargaining and interest rates policy. Unions in the export-oriented sectors and employers have also been able to reach common ground on the macro-economics of growth, in particular the adjustments towards a Swedish membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (SOU, 2002: 16) .
The transition to a new monetary policy and leaner social and employment policies has certainly not been conflict-free: there have been major upheavals within the labour movement, which has been responsible for most of the policy adjustments during the 1990s, including when it was in opposition between 1991 and 1994 and developed two crisis packages along with the centre-right government. Since the policies have begun to pay off in the form of lower unemployment, relatively high growth and budget surpluses, the system seems now to be widely accepted, and there is no real opposition to the norms-based economic policy, the semi-centralized wage-bargaining system and the reformed welfare system. However, the policies for research and innovation are much more controversial. Within science and technology policy, a number of different strands have competed in the 1990s. Unlike Denmark and Finland, there has been no consensus on the micro-foundations of economic growth. Instead, the two political blocs have presented rather different interpretations of the need for institutional adjustments of innovation support.
In the early 1990s, the centre-right Bildt government stressed the need for a systemic change of the Swedish growth model. A central aspect of the programme was a boost of research expenditure. A radical increase in spending on strategic research -combined with market deregulations, privatizations of public companies and tax cuts -was expected to lay the basis for economic growth. The main instrument for the surge in research spending was the strategic research foundations, the largest of which having a focus on engineering and life sciences research (Benner, 2001 ). However, with the deep recession, most of the system change rhetoric and practice disappeared. In 1994, when the Social Democrats returned to political power, the earlier reforms were mostly rolled back, the strategic research foundations were re-integrated into the public policy sphere and public R&D expenditure was reduced. The main growth policy target of the period was to curb the budget deficit to reduce interest rates and thereby stimulate investments and growth. Research and innovation policies came much lower on the list of priorities, as opposed to the situation in Finland.
After the period of acute crisis management, Sweden has, like the other Scandinavian countries, developed various policies for the upgrading of regional industrial and technological capacity. This includes regional growth agreements, where regional representatives from industry, organizations and unions jointly decide on the allocation of regional policy funds (NUTEK, 2001 ). Added to this, cluster programmes have been established to strengthen the institutional infrastructure for growth and employment by supporting regionally concentrated constellations of actors and organizations (NUTEK, 2000; Vinnova, 2002) .
These are relatively small and uncoordinated efforts, however, and most follow the traditional industrial and regional policy trajectory of supporting investments in small companies.
There have been several attempts to create a broader national strategy for a technological upgrading of Swedish industry. After the election in 1998, following the difficult years of establishing budget discipline and wage moderation, the Social Democratic government invited the labour market parties to form an ' Alliance for Growth'. The Alliance was focused primarily on wage-setting mechanisms, an infected issue after the confrontations between unions and employers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The failure of the Alliance can therefore be explained by the unwillingness of the employers to meet the demands of the trade unions to recentralize wage bargaining and strengthen central union leadership (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 254) . Somewhat surprisingly, given the political controversies on growth policies, union representatives and industrialists have agreed on a programme focusing on the microeconomics of growth (Bennet, 2002) . They did so in a report which proposed a string of interventions to improve the international competitiveness of Swedish industry: support of sectoral innovation systems in existing areas of industrial specialization, research in promising technologies with yet limited industrial counterparts, training and competence support for employees, and support of design and production technology development. The group proposed major investments funded by private-public partnerships to bring about a 'world class innovation system . . . which will create the preconditions for increased growth, high and stable employment, and welfare' (Bennet, 2002) . However, the future of the programme seems unclear, and there is no political commitment to implement the industrial renewal strategy, despite its corporatist anchoring. The fact that the Swedish economy scores high in international studies of innovation activities has led the current Social Democratic government to the conclusion that the current institutional set-up is not in need of radical reforms (Rosengren and Östros, 2002) . The centre-right opposition, while disagreeing on the state of the Swedish economy, also contends that there is no need for large-scale innovation programmes.
A recurrent theme in discussions on Sweden's future in a knowledge-based economy is the lack of resource concentration in strategic research areas. This was one of the motives behind the reorganization of the research council system, where five councils were merged to form the new Research Council (Benner, 2001) . One of the missions of the Council was to concentrate resources to particularly important and promising research fields. Despite these proclamations, the new Council has been rather cautious in launching such strategic programmes, owing to budgetary constraints and heated debates on the balance between project and programme support. Such a concentrated support has instead become a task for the new research foundations and other private actors, such as the Wallenberg Foundation. The Strategic Research Foundation, for instance, has responded to repeated criticisms of an underfunding of biomedical research in Sweden in comparison with other countries (cf. Belfrage, 2002) . The mechanism identified to bring about such a concentration was 'strategic centres' in the life sciences. Two of the centres work in a field identified as a potential source of technological and industrial renewal, namely neural stem cell research (Boston Consulting Group, 2001) . Another strategic initiative emanating from the Wallenberg Foundation is the support of postgenomics research. The Foundation funds two national networks, with total budgets of almost 1 billion SEK over five years and invests primarily in modern technologies for postgenomics.
To sum up, Sweden has in many respects responded successfully to the challenges of the new economic system. During the 1990s, a stringent management of financial policy emerged, as did a stable decentralization of wage bargaining and a ceiling on the costs of the welfare state expenditure. At the same time, the foundations of the welfare system have been more or less retained. This has taken place in parallel with growing investments in R&D, and the proportion of middle and high-technology sectors is increasing within the Swedish economy. Although Finland is catching up, Sweden keeps the leading position on all major dimensions of the knowledge economy: scientific productivity, knowledge-intensity of products and services, and R&D expenditure (Andersson et al., 2002) .
There are a few challenging issues also for Sweden. One is the internationalization of innovation systems and knowledge networks. Sweden has benefited from the international outlook and orientation of its leading firms. The question now is whether the accelerating internationalization of these companies will dry up the domestic system of innovation. The multinationals perform the major part of their R&D in Sweden, which is one of the explanations behind the large investments in R&D in Sweden (Andersson et al., 2002) . The question is whether this domestic dominance will continue into the future. If not, R&D expenditure in Sweden will probably decrease quite quickly, and the knowledge networks that have emerged around the multinational firms (with small companies, consultants, academic institutions, research institutes, etc.) will be threatened.
For public policy, the main issue in relation to this challenge is to build the foundations for new growth patterns, if and when the successful trajectories around a few firms and a few sectors and technological fields will lose their competitiveness. Efforts at building up and consolidating new research fields have, at best, been restricted and relatively uncoordinated compared to, for instance, the situation in Finland. Efforts to build regional innovation clusters have also been half-hearted, with little public resources invested. Finally, there have been only limited efforts to improve the technological foundations of the engines of the Swedish economy, the middle-tech industries such as engineering and raw materials refining. In sum, Sweden is a highly innovative and knowledge-intensive economy, but it lacks an integrated vision of how the competitive advantages of Swedish industry should be reinforced and made to last, as well as how new areas should be developed (cf. Weiss, 1998) . As in Norway, the strength of the existing growth paradigm blocks alternative visions and policies. This has been exacerbated by the difficulty in developing new partnerships and roles, owing to the organizational strength of the Swedish industry, which defers etatism (and generally prefers macro-economic intervention), as well as the fragmentation of the state apparatus, which makes it difficult to develop coherent, cross-sectoral policies.
Denmark: the networked route to the knowledge economy
The Danish economy has traditionally been organized around craft-based, flexible and specialized small and medium-sized enterprises, with a dominance for raw materials-based production and a focus on international markets. The large number of small and medium-sized enterprises has not led to a fragmentation of the industrial structure; instead, these companies have often been connected into industrial networks. These networks function as a kind of substitute for those larger firms that can act as industrial and technological locomotives (as in Sweden and, to some extent, Finland). As the sectoral composition of the Danish economy has not been altered dramatically over past decades, the agro-industrial complex remains the most important export sector. Research and development intensity in Denmark is markedly lower than in Finland and Sweden (see Table 2 ), although it could be argued that this is compensated for by the integration of smaller enterprises into various industrial networks. Danish industry, therefore, has its competitive advantages primarily in the agro-industrial sector, but Denmark also has a strong international position in biotechnology and in pharmaceuticals, boosting its high-technology profile (see Table 3 ).
For some time, Denmark has been presented as a 'miracle', as an economy which has developed from depression and low activity into a flourishing model with low and shrinking unemployment, dynamic industrial networks and stable public finances. The foundations of this transformation have been a turn to a nonaccommodating financial policy, an activist labour market policy, a network-oriented industrial policy, and a research and technology policy to create scientific concentration and knowledge flows within the economy. Remarkably, this new growth model has not been the subject of major political controversy, but has instead been embraced by the whole political spectrum, giving large stability effects.
Danish economic policy changed much earlier than its Scandinavian counterparts from an activist stance towards a non-accommodating policy. Already in the early 1980s, a fixed exchange rate policy was established to reduce inflationary tendencies.
At the same time, and again first among the Scandinavian countries, Denmark abolished its regulations of financial and currency markets. In addition to the norms-based and liberalized strategies, Denmark also launched, again first among the Scandinavian countries, large technology development programmes in the 1980s to upgrade the industrial structure, deemed to be backward by international standards (Torfing, 1999: 382) . The early 1990s was a period of intensified structural policy activity, including a string of cluster programmes to improve the so-called framework conditions for national resource areas, such as food and pharmaceuticals. An important element in the technology development programmes has been their decentralized character, relying on private-public partnerships in the design and implementation of industrial restructuring support (Pedersen et al., 1992) .
All these examples indicate that the Danish political system from very early on adjusted its institutional measures for economic growth. To begin with, following a long period of economic decline, labour market instability, high inflation and growing unemployment, a new macroeconomic model was established in the early 1980s (Iversen, 1999: 140-2) . After a relatively sluggish start for this strategy, the nonaccommodating policy began to pay off after a few years, although it ended with an overheating of the economy, cooled only by a so-called potato cure to reduce inflationary tendencies. Nonetheless, the norms-based economic policy seemed firmly anchored towards the end of the 1980s.
To give this growth-enhancing policy mix further pace, an activist labour market policy was designed in the early 1990s. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, labour market policy had functioned as a safety net in times of chronically high unemployment. With the tendencies towards higher activity in the economy, labour market policy was reformulated as a 'trampoline model', the purpose being to put work before benefits by introducing a maximum duration of the unemployment insurance and tougher qualification criteria (Torfing, 1999: 385f.) . Activation has been the lead theme, linking labour market policy to the growth policy instruments, both its macro-and microeconomic elements. Firms and sectors were to become more innovative and knowledgeintensive, while the labour market had to respond to the industrial dynamics and structural transformations, and the macro-economic framework sufficiently tight to avoid inflationary pressures. Recently, a policy to activate also those at the margin of the labour marketlabelled an 'inclusive labour market' -has been launched, targeting the long-term unemployed, elderly workers, immigrants, and operating mainly through wage subsidies (OECD, 2002a: 52) . The intensified labour market policy activities have also paid off in the form of lower unemployment rates (see Table 5 ).
A change of systems has also taken place in Danish wage bargaining, where a system of 'centralized decentralization' has emerged. This reflects the Danish industrial structure, with its many small and medium-sized enterprises, which makes a decentralization more or less necessary. However, to ensure stable wage formation, the decentralization to so-called bargaining areas is coordinated by the central organizations to avoid wage races between areas and to ensure that the export sector is the wage leader (Iversen, 1999: 150) .
In many ways, Denmark has made a highly successful adaptation of its institutional set-up to the demands of an internationally open economy, including demands for a more knowledge-intensive and flexible production and restrictions on state expenditure. Linked to this growth strategy, the Danish research system has been concentrated and reorganized in the 1990s. The international position of Danish research has historically been strong, if measured by productivity and visibility (see Table 4 ). To sustain this position, and to concentrate research efforts to a smaller number of research environments, Denmark, again first among the Scandinavian countries, initiated a CoE strategy in the early 1990s. These centres were intended to bring about a concentration of research efforts in various scientific and technological fields deemed critical, on the basis of a collaboration between research groups with different research foci. They were also intended to facilitate public and private sector research collaboration. They were financed not only by the state but also by industry, and industry was invited to perform some of its research within the Centres (Benner and Sandström, 2000) . The CoEs were also part of a general reorganization of the research funding system in the early 1990s, where large and interdisciplinary programmes were given priority (Grønbaek, 2000) .
To further support a reorganization of the Danish research system, a programme of 'large, interdisciplinary research groups' was established in 2001, targeting areas with the potential of combining academic disciplines and creating platforms for public-private research interaction. The supported centres have an orientation toward strategic areas such as functional genomics and information technology. The Danish National Research Foundation, established in 1991 with a capital stock of 2 billion DKK, has also backed up the CoE strategy, giving long-term support to over 30 research centres, mainly in engineering, the natural sciences and biomedicine. A final example of the dedication of the Danish state to earmarking support for research and innovation is its decision to use the resources gained -estimated at 1 billion DKK -from an UMTS (mobile phone spectrum) auction on research and innovation support, such as private-public innovation partnerships.
All these measures to concentrate and consolidate Danish research efforts would not matter much if they had not been connected with other policy areas in a relatively coherent structural policy for growth, employment and welfare. Furthermore, much effort has gone into building coalitions around these goals and their implementation, rather than dictating from above (Torfing, 1999) . Support programmes are therefore not as fragmented and isolated as they appear to be in Sweden and Norway, and there is also an ambition to build strong socio-political constituencies around the growth strategies (cf. Nielsen, 1995) . It is striking how strongly the need for technological upgrading is stressed in Danish growth policy documents and programmes, and Denmark -along with Finlandhas, in that respect, pioneered a systemic policy approach on growth and innovation within Europe (cf. Regeringen, 2002) .
It has been argued that the Danish route to the knowledge economy is based on a collective learning system (Lundvall, 2002) . Denmark would therefore represent a socially responsible model of knowledge-based growth. The rate of innovation and learning within the economy is based on a collective responsibility for competence, skill and technological upgrading, organized in networks based on trust and reputation (cf. Kristensen, 1994 ). When this modelwhich has long historical roots -was combined with the supply-side labour market policies, and coordinated programmes for industrial clusters and for sectoral research and technological development, Denmark seemed to have developed a more stable growth pattern. There are some remaining difficulties, though, such as a relatively small high-technology sector in comparison with Finland and Sweden (Andersson et al., 2002; Lundvall, 2002) . The network model is not without its difficulties either, since the networks are vulnerable to mergers and acquisitions across national borders, giving international business consortia an increasingly important role. Both of these structural weaknesses were addressed in an analysis of the Danish innovation system some 10 years ago (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993: 288-9) , which indicates that a decade of strong growth and major growth policy initiatives has not corrected these imbalances in an otherwise dynamic economy.
Despite these cautious remarks, Denmark has adjusted successfully to the changing economic conditions. When the Social Democrats resigned from government in 1982, there seemed to be a consensus on radical reforms of growth policies, and this has been implemented in a sequential manner, beginning with monetary policy, later followed by industrial policy, labour market policy, and, more recently, research and innovation policies. The aim has been to establish a new growth paradigm, while retaining the fundamentals of the traditional welfare model. It has been possible to develop such a model on the basis of a cooperative political climate, where the lack of dominant political parties has fostered minority governments forced to engage in 'policy and party shopping' (Schmidt, 2000: 264) . Another precondition for the successful implementation of the growth models is the negotiated character of the Danish economy (Nielsen and Pedersen, 1988) . Major economic and industrial initiatives are, traditionally, subject to negotiations between a broad spectrum of agents and organizations. This consensus-building process is without doubt slow, but it produces broad social and political support behind the growth strategies adopted.
Conclusion: the Scandinavian model in the knowledge-based economy
The Western European countries have had major difficulties keeping up with the US economy in the past decade. One oftenmentioned cause of this is the failure to develop, disseminate and absorb new technologies, such as information technology, biotechnology and advanced materials. The ' American challenge' is nothing new in European history -a similar fear was expressed in the 1960s, when the growing dominance of US multinational firms was seen as a threat to the technological independence of the European states. Today, the focus is not so much on individual companies as on the innovative capabilities of the European states. This is causing much concern among European policymakers. When the European Council met in Lisbon in May 2000, one item on the agenda was how to develop a strategy for bringing the European countries into a knowledge-based economy and, more specifically, how to foster high-technology sectors. The poor performance of the European Union economies in comparison with the US was explained by a less flexible labour market, a more fragmented research system, less vibrant venture capital markets, and lack of an entrepreneurial culture (Watson, 2001: 506) .
However, there seem to be exceptions to the laggard status of the European economies, namely the Scandinavian countries, which are all characterized by high growth, a rapid introduction of new technologies, while maintaining an advanced social protection and regulated labour markets. The Scandinavian employment and welfare model is based on tax-financed social services, generous social insurances, organized labour markets with limited wage and employment flexibility, and a commitment to full employment. This model has, as described by Clayton and Pontusson (1998) , more or less survived the restrictions imposed by the globalization of product and financial markets. The reductions that have taken place have been more of a quantitative than a qualitative nature and, therefore, represent -in Scharpf and Schmidt's (2000) terminology -a successful adjustment of the welfare and employment models to the changing external conditions rather than a change of system.
There are many possible explanations for the continuity within employment regulation and social policy: there have been limited social foundations for a retrenchment strategy, and no major political party has attempted such a policy, not even the centre-right governments. Furthermore, the labour market parties have, to a varying degree, formed 'social pacts' to enact wage restraint and improve the international competitiveness of firms.
Looking at the research and innovation strategies, we find a more experimental model with new measures as responses to the changing economic conditions. The Finnish example is one of the most successful institutional reconfigurations: since the deep crisis of the early 1990s, the Finnish growth-stimulating institutions have been thoroughly, and quickly, reconstructed in a committed effort to upgrade the economy. The strategy, developed in a consensual manner, was headed and coordinated by the Prime Minister and integrated with other strategies, such as the centralized wagebargaining system. Finland thus made a committed effort to enter a new growth paradigm and adjusted its institutional structure accordingly. Denmark shares many of these characteristics, although it pursued its new growth strategy in a different sequential order and at a slower pace. It began with the change of macroeconomic regime and later added a more aggressive policy for a structural transformation of the economy. As in Finland, the political system was open to more radical solutions: the older institutional arrangements seemed not suited to the new economic conditions, and there was a broad political consensus that new institutional responses had to be developed.
Sweden confronted the crisis of the 1990s in a more path-dependent manner than Finland did. Support of high-tech sectors, innovation systems and industrial and regional clusters has not been systematically established; instead, there has been more of an uncoordinated patchwork of smaller initiatives. There are several possible explanations for the difference between Finland and Sweden. The crisis of the Swedish economy was not as deep as in Finland, which made the need for drastic institutional reforms less pressing. Furthermore, the starting-point for the Swedish economy was better, with several technology-intensive multinational companies and a very strong research and development system. Hence, Sweden already seemed well-prepared for the knowledge economy, and there was no political consensus on the need to make institutional adjustments, as was the case in Finland. The Norwegian development is similar to the Swedish one. With no immediate pressure for a structural transformation of the economy in the presence of the rich oil supplies, the institutional adjustments have been relatively weak, and there is no real socio-political backing of a radically new growth strategy as a response to the challenges of the knowledge-based economy. As an indication of this, research and innovation issues were marginal in the election debates prior to the election in 2002, as they were in the Swedish election campaign the same year (STEP Group, 2002) .
Even considering these differences, the Scandinavian countries as a collective seem to be successful in their adaptation to the demands and restrictions of the global, knowledge-based economy, more so than the larger European countries. In a period generally marked by stagnant growth in Europe, the Scandinavian countries have managed the transition to the demands of the new economy well. Finland is the most striking example, with its concerted effort to move from a raw materials-based growth pattern into knowledge-intensive production, while not deviating from the established welfare and employment policies. Denmark, with its determined efforts to reform the labour market while building on its traditional decentralized and networked economic structure, must also be considered a success story.
On the whole, the development of the Scandinavian countries confirms Garrett's (1998) assertion that countries based on 'social democratic corporatism' succeed in a globalized economy precisely because they are able to implement wage-restraint programmes, deliver social stability even with volatile markets, and provide the economy with collective goods, such as productive policies for regional, knowledgeintensive, development, support of technology transfer, innovation systems, etc. They have, in the terminology of Jessop (2002) , successfully pursued a combined neo-statist and neocorporatist strategy as a response to the challenges of the new economic order, with an activist state developing an infrastructure for innovation (supported by decentralized innovation networks), but also with centralized social pacts in support of wage restraint and changes of industrial organization.
A word of caution might be in place. The small size of the Scandinavian economies increases their vulnerability to technical change, market fluctuations and corporate reorganizations. Larger countries tend to have a more varied industrial structure and are, therefore, generally less vulnerable to such imbalances. Thus, it seems important to build policy consensus around growth strategies, and be observant of the institutional responses needed to changes in markets, technologies and corporate strategies. The challenge is, therefore, to maintain the social policy heritage, while redesigning old instruments (such as university research, regional and industrial policy) and introducing new policies (cluster support, centres of expertise, regional networks, and so on) to support the new forces of economic growth. This calls for the development of a political capacity to redesign existing policies while retaining traditional commitments (Katzenstein, 1985) . The future of the Scandinavian welfare and employment model seems to be found in the historical tradition of accepting economic change and adjusting to it in a socially acceptable way.
